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TIPPING THE BALANCE BACK: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE MIXED 
MOTIVE THEORY UNDER THE ADEA 
INTRODUCTION 
One day in May 2010, Gregory Wehking, a clerical clerk, sat nervously in 
his boss Rachel Moro’s office.1  His employer, the Bown Company, was 
undergoing restructuring, and his job could be in jeopardy.  Gregory didn’t 
want to lose his job because he enjoyed working; he thought at the age of 66 it 
would be difficult to find a new job; and he needed the income to pay the 
family’s bills.  Ms. Moro started the meeting by putting Gregory at ease when 
she spoke highly of his performance record.  However, the meeting’s tone 
changed quickly.  Gregory’s boss next noted Gregory had been with the Bown 
Company for quite a long time, over 35 years.  Then, Ms. Moro asked Gregory 
how old he was.  Upon learning Gregory was 66 years old, she suggested he 
retire.  Gregory protested, and he told her he did not want to retire; he felt 
good, and he liked to work.  Despite his protest, Ms. Moro fired Gregory. 
Gregory was fired during the Bown Company’s corporate restructuring, 
during which it reduced the number of clerical clerk positions.  At Gregory’s 
office, a younger clerical clerk employee was allowed to keep her job.  After 
the restructuring, the Bown Company had positions similar to a clerical clerk 
available in Gregory’s office and other offices.  Gregory was qualified for 
these positions.  The Bown Company has a history of providing job training 
when transferring employees to new positions.  The Bown Company did not 
offer to relocate any clerical employees to different cities.  Gregory was not 
offered any of these positions. 
Despite some strong evidence Gregory’s boss used his age as a factor in 
the termination, he cannot state a viable claim under the Age Discrimination 
Employment Act (“ADEA”).  Gregory was required, under “but for” causation, 
to show the Bown Company fired him because of his age and that age was a 
determinative factor in his firing.  Since the Bown Company reduced 
Gregory’s position during its corporate restructuring, it can claim more than 
half of its reason for firing Gregory resulted from the restructuring.  Without 
the mixed motive theory, Gregory could not prove his age motivated his firing.  
The court dismissed Gregory’s age discrimination claim.  The Bown Company 
was not required to defend its decision to fire Gregory. 
 
 1. This hypothetical is based on Hnizdor v. Pyramid Mouldings, Inc., No. 05 C 1740, 2010 
WL 1752544, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010). 
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Gregory is not alone.  All too often plaintiffs lose employment 
discrimination suits.2  Of the 100,000 employment discrimination claims filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) each year, 
roughly 20,000 cases are filed in federal court.3  “Only about fifteen percent of 
the claims filed with the [EEOC] result in some relief being provided to 
plaintiffs, a percentage that tends to fall below other administrative claims.”4 
While discrimination cases are already very difficult for plaintiffs to win, 
the Supreme Court recently made it more difficult to win an age discrimination 
claim under the ADEA claim.  In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Court 
removed the mixed motive theory from the ADEA framework and left behind 
the “but for” causation analysis.5  “But for” causation imperfectly serves the 
purpose of the ADEA because it does not account for the human decision 
making process.6  Further, the standard favors the defendant, which limits the 
law’s deterrent effect and increases the chance an older worker will be harmed 
mentally and economically by discrimination.7  The mixed motive theory 
should be available under the ADEA. 
This Comment first explores the statutory and case law histories of the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 and the ADEA, culminating with Gross.  
Second, it proposes viable interpretations of the ADEA that bring the mixed 
motive theory within the ADEA framework.  Finally, it explains why the 
ADEA still needs the mixed motive theory. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS AND AGE DISCRIMINATION 
EMPLOYMENT ACT 
In response to growing societal pressures to value and protect certain 
classes of people from discrimination at the federal level, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA of 1964”).8  The Act, specifically Title VII, 
protects an individual based on his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.9  It recognizes, however, the protected status may be explicitly 
considered with bone fide occupational qualifications (“BFOQ”) or 
disproportionately affected if that practice is a business necessity.10  The 
 
 2. Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 561 (2001). 
 3. Id. at 557–58 & n.10 (the years surveyed were 1992-1999). 
 4. Id. at 558. 
 5. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
 6. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 8. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD 
AT A YOUNG AGE 16–17 (2001). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 10. Id.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion); Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
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overall purpose of Title VII is to protect individuals in these classes from 
adverse employment decisions because of his or her protected status.11  In 
short, employment ought to be based on an individual’s abilities, but at the 
very least, employers ought not to discriminate systematically against members 
of traditionally disadvantaged groups. 
Drafts of the CRA of 1964 included age as a protected status,12 but the 
final version of this CRA excluded age.13  Congress concluded age differed 
from the Title VII protected statuses and therefore ordered the Secretary of 
Labor W. Willard Wirtz to determine if age discrimination should be similarly 
prohibited.14 
During this time, age discrimination was not uncommon.  For example, by 
the 1890s and 1900s, it was commonplace for workers over forty to be shut out 
of the workforce.15  A 1957 survey of 121 companies found employers were 
more likely not to hire women aged thirty-five years or more and men aged 
thirty years or more because of their age.16  Fifty-six percent of these 
employers would not even consider an application from a woman who was 
over the age of fifty.17  Forty-two percent of these employers would not 
consider a man’s application if he was over fifty.18 
Secretary Wirtz’s report revealed no surprises: older workers were in need 
of statutory protection from age discrimination.  The report contained five 
basic premises.  First, many employers have implicit or explicit age limits in 
which they will hire or retain employees.19  Second, by implementing these age 
limits, employers notably affect the rights and opportunities of those 
employees.20  Third, though age discrimination differs from race or religious 
discrimination because age stereotypes are typically not fueled by animus,21 
age stereotypes are still not based on objective fact.22  Fourth, the performance 
 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 12. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. 2000e-14 (2006)); DEP’T. OF LABOR, SEC. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: 
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT iii (1965). 
 15. KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS 5 (2001). 
 16. Id. at 86 (citing Old Men of 30, Crones of 35 Now Feel First Hiring Bars Because of 
Age, BUS. WK., July 20, 1957, at 38). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 3, 16–17. 
 20. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17. 
 21. The stereotypes can still be harmful without animus.  29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2006).  
Accordingly, animus is not required to violate the statute.  E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 
231 (1983). 
 22. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16–17. 
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of older workers was generally at or above the level of their younger cohorts.23  
Finally, age discrimination is harmful to the national economy because it 
removes a large number of able-bodied workers from the work force, drives up 
the costs of unemployment benefits and Social Security, and causes economic 
and psychological injury to older workers.24  
As a result, in 1967, Congress passed the ADEA.25  The ADEA’s purpose 
is “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than 
age.”26  Like Title VII, the ADEA prohibits employment decisions based on 
protected status—here, age.27  A person belongs to the protected class once he 
or she is age forty or older.28  The ADEA also recognizes two instances where 
employers can treat older workers worse than younger workers.29 
The ADEA’s first exception BFOQ is the affirmative defense to disparate 
treatment, or explicit age-based classification.  A BFOQ is limited to situations 
that are reasonably necessary to the business’ operation.30  The Supreme Court 
and the EEOC narrowly define BFOQ.31  An employer will only be allowed to 
limit a particular job to someone under thirty-nine if, for example, the 
functions of the job are age-linked or people over a certain age cannot do the 
work without endangering the safety of others.32  There are few jobs that meet 
these stringent criteria. 
The second exception is the affirmative defense to disparate impact: 
reasonable factors other than age (“RFOA”).33  A disparate impact is not illegal 
 
 23. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16–17. 
 24. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104. 
 25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).  Today older workers face the negative stereotypes of 
inadaptability, incompetence with technology, and inability to learn new technology.  Barbara L. 
Hassell et al., An Examination of Beliefs about Older Workers: Do Stereotypes Still Exist?, 16 J. 
OF ORG. BEHAV. 457, 458 (1995).  However, positive stereotypes are associated with older 
workers:  loyally and experience.  Id. at 459. 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (2006). 
 28. Id. at § 631(a). 
 29. Id. at § 623(f). 
 30. Id. at § 623(f)(1). 
 31. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S 400, 412 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321, 333 (1977); Tullis v. Lear Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1989); Open Letter 
from Dianna B. Johnston, Assistant Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n 
(July 25, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2002/adea_liability_insurance.html. 
 32. W. Air Lines, Inc., 472 U.S at 412–14. 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).  Disparate impact differs from disparate treatment because with 
disparate treatment the employer explicitly uses age as the criterion for the employment decision.  
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610–12 (1993).  If the employer’s decision is not 
made because of age itself, there is no disparate treatment even if the reason is age based.  Id.  
The exception is if the employer chose the reason to target older people.  Id.  However if this 
reason does not constitute as disparate treatment, it might still cause an illegal disparate impact.  
Id. 
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if a factor other than age is reasonable, which is something less than a business 
necessity as required by Title VII.34  RFOA marks a substantial distinction 
from Title VII because the RFOA exception is interpreted broadly.35  Further, a 
RFOA does not need to be the least discriminatory option available.36  In order 
to successfully use the RFOA defense, the criterion only needs to be 
reasonable.37 
Overall, the ADEA and Title VII are strikingly similar in purpose and in 
creation of negative rights.38  The main difference, albeit a substantial 
difference, is the RFOA exception in the ADEA.  Notwithstanding this 
difference, from the 1960s to the summer of 2009, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, analyzed the ADEA and Title VII similarly.39  Many analyses 
of the ADEA heavily borrowed from the analyses of Title VII.  Even as late as 
2005 in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held Congress intended 
the ADEA to be subject to the same analysis used in Title VII because 
Congress used the same language in each statute and enacted each within a 
short time span.40  The Court departed from this longstanding practice in 
Gross. 
II.  CASE LAW HISTORY 
After Congress passes a law, that law is not self-enforcing.  Rather, the 
judiciary must interpret the meaning of the text and apply the law to particular 
factual scenarios to fully flesh out its meaning.  A statute’s meaning can be 
static or dynamic over time because of influences such as an individual judge’s 
philosophy and/or current societal views.  Professor William Murphy, in 
observing the Supreme Court’s treatment of anti-discrimination law, notes that 
not since the New Deal has the Court interpreted statutes in such a hostile 
manner by severely restricting these laws’ applicability.41  Congress passed the 
anti-discrimination laws to provide greater protection for employees,42 but the 
Supreme Court has largely interpreted these laws, including the ADEA, to 
favor employers.43  Over the years, various courts have interpreted the ADEA 
 
 34. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238 (2005). 
 35. Id. at 240; Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610–14. 
 36. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 95–96 (2008). 
 37. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238–39. 
 38. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. 
 39. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–43; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354–55 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 40. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233; 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 
 41. William P. Murphy, Meandering Musings about Discrimination Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 
649, 654 (1994) (noting in the 1989 session, the Supreme Court found for the employer in 13 of 
the 14 employment law cases). 
 42. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 43. Murphy, supra note 41, at 654. 
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to include the disparate impact theory as well as the disparate treatment theory 
and its mixed motives variation.44  Of the three, the latter two, disparate 
treatment and mixed motives, will be the focus of this Comment. 
Under disparate impact, an employer is liable for its actions if they are 
discriminatory in operation, whether or not they have a discriminatory purpose 
or appear facially neutral in the abstract.45  An employer, under Title VII, may 
avoid liability by showing the practice is a business necessity.46  In 1989, the 
plaintiffs in Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio presented statistical evidence in 
order to satisfy their burden of persuasion.47  The Supreme Court held the 
plaintiffs could not establish causation and therefore carry their burden by 
merely showing statistical deviations.48  A plaintiff must identify the specific 
employment practice that is the source of the statistical disparity in order to 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.49  Then, the defendant bears 
the burden to demonstrate the requirement is a business necessity.50  If the 
defendant meets the burden, the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows 
other less discriminatory methods were available to reach the employer’s 
desired goal(s).51 
The Supreme Court recognized the disparate impact theory under the 
ADEA in Smith v. City of Jackson.52  The Court held Wards Cove, a case 
Congress statutorily overrode,53 controls the ADEA disparate impact theory.54  
 
 44. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (using the disparate impact theory under the ADEA); Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (using the disparate treatment theory under the 
ADEA); Rachid v. Jack in the Box Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (using the mixed 
motive theory under the ADEA). 
 45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). 
 46. Id.  A business necessity is a practice that “accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an 
applicant’s ability to perform successfully the job in question.”  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 
F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 47. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 48. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. 
 49. See id. at 650–52. 
 50. Id. at 658. 
 51. Id. at 660. 
 52. 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
 53.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejects many, but not all, of the principles that the majority 
had adopted in Wards Cove.  Section 105(a) retains the requirement of Wards Cove that a 
complainant isolate particular practices causing disparate impact.  It allows the parties, 
however, to view the entire decision-making process as one employment practice if the 
complaining party shows that one cannot separate the elements of an employer’s 
decisionmaking [sic] process analytically.  The Act is broad enough to cover the situation 
where interaction of two or more components in hiring or promotion causes the adverse 
impact. 
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Differences exist between disparate impact under Title VII and the ADEA.  
Unlike Title VII’s narrowly-construed business necessity defense, the ADEA’s 
RFOA defense is broadly construed.55 
Disparate treatment cases, by far the more prototypical case, focus on 
intentional discrimination.56  A plaintiff must show three elements to succeed: 
1) discriminatory intent, 2) differential treatment “because of” a protected 
status, and 3) a link between the discriminatory intent and the differential 
treatment.57  In a motion for summary judgment, the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine test can be used to establish a prima facie case.58  This test 
largely serves a procedural function: once the plaintiff shows a prima facie 
case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is raised.59  Then, the 
employer must “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the 
different treatment.60  If the employer does this, the presumption of 
discrimination disappears and becomes only a permissible inference.61  At this 
 
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the 
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 933–34 (1993). 
 54. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
 55. Id.  A RFOA, unlike a business necessity, only needs to be reasonable and not necessary.  
Id. at 253.  Reasonableness does not require relevance; however, if the explanation is 
unreasonable, there is an inference of pretext for intentional discrimination.  Id. 
 56. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); MICHAEL J. 
ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2 (7th ed. 2008). 
 57.  ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 56, at 2, 6, 86 (“[T]he Court [in Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing] instructed the lower courts to take a more holistic review of the record evidence and 
reminded them to draw all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment . . . .  The 
Court accepted any evidence indicating discrimination as relevant and probative of the ultimate 
question of discrimination and made clear that cases were not confined to any particular theory or 
claim of discrimination”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (holding the 
plaintiff’s ultimate burden is to persuade the trier of fact that the adverse employment action 
happened because of his or her protected status). 
 58. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). 
 59. Id. at 254; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973).  The prima facie test is flexible and bends itself to the factual circumstances.  
Webb v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 167 F. App’x. 725, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the forth 
prong of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test is modified in a Reduction in Force situation 
because the employee is not always replaced); Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349–
51 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the fourth prong consists of showing the plaintiff “was either i) 
replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) 
otherwise discharged because of his age.”); Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“Recognizing that these burdens should not be applied rigidly, we have adapted them in 
special cases to reflect more fairly and accurately the underlying reality of the workplace.”). 
 60. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 61. Id. at 807; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. 
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point, the plaintiff can only prevail by showing the employer’s proffered 
reason is a pretext for discrimination.62 
The Supreme Court in Hazen Paper v. Biggins incorporated the disparate 
treatment theory in the ADEA.  An employer is liable if the adverse 
employment action is motivated by age itself.63  But, if a decision is motivated 
by something that is not literally age, even though it is closely correlated with 
age, the employer is not liable.64  A decision to terminate an employee because 
his pension is vesting is a decision based on a factor closely correlated with 
age.65  Such a decision is not rooted in the behavior the ADEA seeks to 
discourage.66  Thus, the Court concluded it is permissible under the ADEA to 
base employment decisions on pension plans vesting, even though these 
employees are likely to be within the protected class.67 
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins realized that forcing 
the plaintiff to prove the discriminatory intent to be more than half of the 
decision’s motivation proved untenable and defeated the purpose of Title VII.68  
Decisions, such as employment decisions, result from a variety of 
motivations.69  Therefore, the plurality established the mixed motive theory 
 
 62. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56.  A plaintiff shows 
pretext by demonstrating the reason offered by the defendant in court is not the reason for the 
defendant’s actions.  Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. 
 63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 610–11. 
 67. Id. at 612–13.  Though no liability was found under the ADEA, Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act bars Hazen Paper’s action that prevented the vesting of the pension plan.  29 
U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
  Employment discrimination cases are fact intensive.  In Hazen Paper, the Court focuses 
on the pension plan vesting in only ten years.  507 U.S. at 611.  Because the vesting period is only 
ten years, employees under forty could have pensions vesting.  Id.  Arguably if the pension vested 
after twenty-five years of service, the Hazen Paper decision may have been different because if 
an employee started at age 18, (s)he would be 43 when the pension vested. 
  The Court has used similar reasoning in Title VII sex discrimination claims.  In General 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, the Court held the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer’s short-term 
disability plan was not discrimination based on sex.  429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976).  Pregnancy, 
though closely correlated to sex, is analytically distinct from sex.  The plan created the groups 
non-pregnant persons and pregnant women.  Id. at 135.  Non-pregnant persons (women and men) 
were covered.  Id.  Further, this disability program was not based on a sex animus or with a 
purpose to discriminate against women.  Id. at 136, 138.  In response to Gilbert, Congress passed 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which stated “because of” sex includes decisions made on the 
basis of pregnancy.  Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
 68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 69. Id.  Consider this hiring hypothetical:  A school district superintendent will be the 
deciding vote in the hiring of a new principal.  WAYNE K. HOY & C. JOHN TARTER, 
ADMINISTRATORS SOLVING PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE: DECISION-MAKING CONCEPTS, CASES, 
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under disparate treatment, although not without first causing confusion over 
what the controlling opinion was and then what it meant.70  The plurality did 
agree liability attached when a plaintiff showed an employer was motivated 
even in part by the employee’s protected status.71  The employer, then, may 
avoid liability if the employer can show, usually with objective evidence, by a 
preponderance of the evidence the same decision would have been made 
absent the protected status.72 
The plurality’s definition of “because of” stems from the statute’s text and 
structure.  First, the plurality used a textual approach and simply considered a 
common understanding of the language.  “Because of” was not colloquial 
shorthand for “but for” or sole causation; this interpretation misunderstood the 
text and context of Title VII.73  “Because of” meant the protected status 
motivated the decision.74  For the plurality, the purpose of the act was violated 
if the employer relied on the protected status at all in forming its decision.75 
The textual argument is then supported by a structural one.  Congress 
acknowledged protected statuses could be considered in the BFOQ affirmative 
defense.76  No other provision of Title VII indicates it is proper to consider the 
protected status under the disparate treatment theory.77  The absence of other 
exceptions indicates Congress allows decision makers to consider protected 
statuses in conjunction with BFOQs and at no other time.78 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the Court’s opinion, finding an employer 
could be liable if part of its decision was based on a protected status, in spite of 
the fact she believed “because of” actually does mean “but for.”79  She 
recognized: 
 
AND CONSEQUENCES 113 (1995).  The superintendent feels pressure from the board of education 
to find a new hire that will fill the shoes of the old beloved principal.  Id. at 110.  Minority parents 
pressure the superintendant to focus more on the minority students’ needs.  Id. at 111.  These 
parents would like to see a minority principal.  Id.  The school board wants the new principal to 
be highly educated with impeccable credentials.  Id.  The school’s current vice president expects 
to be appointed principal.  Id. at 112.  In this simple scenario, the superintendant only feels 
pressure from five sources.  By the time the superintendant has made a recommendation, she will 
have considered a multitude of factors. 
 70. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12. 
 71. Id. at 258. 
 72. Id.  After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a Defendant may avoid damages but not liability.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 73. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. 
 74. Id. at 240–41. 
 75. Id. at 242. 
 76. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)). 
 77. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Particularity in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often 
made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring 
the plaintiff to prove that any one fact was definitive cause of the decision 
makers’ act may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such 
decisions.80 
Because of the difficulty in demonstrating the “but for” reason for the action, 
the plaintiff then bears the burden to prove the protected trait was a substantial 
factor in the adverse employment decision.81  The burden of proof—substantial 
factor—is required in part because the protected traits of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin can never be completely discounted in the professional 
world.82  For Justice O’Connor, a high standard of proof is required because 
people can observe and comment on these traits benignly, while not harboring 
discriminatory animus.83  In addition, the plaintiff must show the protected 
status was a substantial factor through direct evidence only.84  A requirement 
of direct evidence better serves Title VII’s deterrent function by identifying the 
situations clearly targeted by the statute.85  Once the burden shifted, the 
employer could avoid liability by showing more likely than not it would have 
made the same decision absent the protected status.86 
Justice White concurred that a plaintiff did not need to show the protected 
status was the sole cause in order to shift the burden to the defendant.87  He 
agreed with the plurality the plaintiff met his or her burden by showing the 
decision was in part motivated by illegal factors.88  Though, unlike the 
plurality, he believes an employer could satisfy its burden with objective 
evidence or with credible testimony.89  Unlike Justice O’Connor, but like the 
plurality, he is silent on whether or not direct evidence is required to shift the 
burdens.90  Similar to the plurality and Justice O’Connor, he believed the 
defendant could avoid liability if it could prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence it would have taken the same action absent the protected status.91 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA of 1991”) attempted to codify and 
overrule various Supreme Court decisions from the 1980s, including Price 
 
 80. Id. at 273. 
 81. Id. at 276. 
 82. Id. at 277. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 276. 
 85. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 261 
 90. See id. at 258–60. 
 91. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253; id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Waterhouse.92  At this time, Congress codified the mixed motive theory.93  
Under § 2000e-2(m), a defendant is liable for discriminatory conduct if the 
plaintiff can show a protected status was a motivating factor, even if other 
legal factors also motivated the decision.94  Congress, when drafting § 2000e-
2(m), chose the plurality and White’s “motivating” factor standard and not 
Justice O’Connor’s “substantial” factor.95  Congress, however, rejected the 
Price Waterhouse plurality scheme that allowed a defendant to avoid liability 
if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence it would have acted the 
same absent the protected class.96  While the burden shifting framework 
remained, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) no longer allowed the employer to avoid liability 
but, instead, limited the damages available to the plaintiff.97  The ADEA text 
was not amended explicitly to include the mixed motive language or damages 
provision.98 
Despite its attempt, the amendment only partially clarified the confusion of 
Price Waterhouse.99  It provides that unlawful employment practices occur 
when illegal factors are a motivating factor in the decision.100  Therefore, the 
amendment addresses to what degree the illegal factors can play a role in a 
decision before liability is attached, which is none.101  Nevertheless, the 
 
 92. Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 47, at § 2. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., 
concurring); id. at 261–62, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a 
member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an 
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused 
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was 
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title. 
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this 
title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action 
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-- 
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and 
attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a 
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). 
Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2). 
 98. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. 
Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).  Other explicit amendments, however, were made to the ADEA at this 
time.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349. 
 99. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2002). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 101. Id. 
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amendment did not address the remaining disagreement between the Justices in 
Price Waterhouse about what type of evidence was needed to shift the burden 
to the defendant.102  In applying the amendment to mixed motive cases, many 
courts found Justice O’Connor’s concurrence controlled and required direct 
evidence to shift the burden to the defendant.103  Other courts found 
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient because the CRA of 1991 was silent on 
a heightened evidentiary standard.104 
In Desert Palace v. Costa, the Supreme Court found circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient in Title VII cases to obtain a mixed motive instruction 
and shift the burden to the defendant.105  The Court based its decision solely on 
the statute and not on the pre-amendment Price Waterhouse decision.106  Title 
VII’s statutory language does not include a heightened evidentiary standard, so 
the Court found there is no heightened evidentiary standard.107 
After Price Waterhouse and the CRA of 1991, courts applied the mixed 
motive theory in ADEA claims.108  Courts assumed mixed motive existed 
under the ADEA because the ADEA uses the same “because of” language that 
was held in Price Waterhouse to encompass mixed motives, although the 
ADEA text was not amended to include the explicit mixed motive language.109 
Because the ADEA did not contain the mixed motives language, a circuit 
split developed over whether direct or circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 
 
 102. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93–95. 
 103. Id. at 95.  Many Courts treated O’Connor’s concurrence as Price Waterhouse’s 
controlling opinion based on the Marks doctrine, which states that when there is a plurality, the 
controlling opinion is the one based on the narrowest grounds.  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Steven, 
J., dissenting). 
 104. Dessert Palace, 539 U.S. at 97. 
 105. Id. at 98–99. 
 106. Id. at 99.  In her Desert Palace concurrence, Justice O’Connor highlighted the 
importance of the 1991 amendments by specifically noting circumstantial evidence is allowed 
only because of the 1991 amendments; otherwise, only direct evidence would suffice.  Id. at 102 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Scholars and academics disagree over Desert Palace’s effect on the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test.  For the argument that Desert Palace replaced the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine test, see William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in 
Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 213–14 (2003).  For the argument that McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine is only applicable in limited settings, see Michael J. Zimmer, The New 
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1887, 1931–32 (2004).  For the argument that Desert Palace had no effect on McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine, see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 107. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99. 
 108. For example, the Second Circuit in Donovan v. Milk Mktg. affirmed that Price 
Waterhouse’s mixed motive theory applied to the ADEA.  Donovan v. Milk Mktg., 243 F.3d 584, 
586 (2d Cir. 2001); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 109. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. 
Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). 
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shift the burden to the defendant for a mixed motive claim.110  The Desert 
Palace decision was based on statutory text not found in the ADEA.111  Yet, in 
Rachid v. Jack in the Box the Fifth Circuit held the mixed motive theory—post 
Desert Palace—did not require direct evidence under the ADEA.112  The 
theory is a merging of the pre-amendment theories from McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine and Price Waterhouse.113  In justifying its holding, the Fifth 
Circuit noted the ADEA and Title VII are both similarly silent as to a 
heightened evidentiary standard and the two statute’s texts are analyzed almost 
identically.114 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services opposed Rachid.  The Eighth Circuit, 
relying on O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence, held a plaintiff must 
present direct evidence in order to receive a mixed motive instruction.115  
Direct evidence, for the Eighth Circuit, properly showed the causal link 
between the decision and discriminatory animus.116 
The plaintiff, Gross, petitioned for certiorari on the availability of a mixed 
motive jury instruction with only circumstantial evidence.117  However, the 
Supreme Court ruled on a threshold issue: the mixed motive theory’s 
availability under the ADEA.118  Peculiarly, the origin of the Supreme Court’s 
decision is not found in the petition for certiorari, only in the respondent’s 
brief.119  The defense counsel’s statement at oral argument adeptly summarizes 
the respondent and the Court’s reasoning.  He urged: 
I would hope that the Court would seize upon this as an opportunity to provide 
some significant clarity in the law, rather than seize this as an opportunity to 
decide this case on the potentially most narrow ground, which . . . will not do 
anything to resolve the mass confusion that seems to exist among the lower 
courts.120 
The Court seized the opportunity to end the confusion by completely removing 
its perceived source—the mixed motive theory.121  Now, the mixed motive 
theory is not available under the ADEA.122 
 
 110. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348; Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311. 
 111. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99. 
 112. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311–12. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 311. 
 115. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2348 n.1; Brief for Respondent at 1, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441). 
 120. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29:20–21, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441). 
 121. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 122. Id. 
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The Court squarely based its decision in the CRA of 1991’s mixed motive 
amendment to Title VII and the lack of amendment to the ADEA.123  Because 
the CRA of 1991 did not amend the ADEA to include the mixed motive theory 
in 1991, Desert Palace’s mixed motive theory is inapplicable to the ADEA.124  
For the majority, Congress’s silence regarding the ADEA and mixed motive 
signaled Congress did not intend the amendment of Title VII to reach the 
ADEA.125 
Now, after passage of the CRA of 1991, the Court has ruled Title VII 
mixed motive case law was inapplicable to the ADEA.  So in order to remove 
Title VII mixed motive case law from before the CRA of 1991, i.e. Price 
Waterhouse, from the analysis, the Court summarily stated it would have 
decided that case differently, and thus the analysis did not apply.126  This Court 
would not and could not interpret the words “because of such individual’s age” 
to encompass a mixed motive theory.127  Even if the Court agreed with the 
mixed motive interpretation, it would have eliminated it because history has 
shown the burden-shifting framework was difficult to apply.128 
In effect, the Court turned the ADEA’s statutory scheme on its head.  The 
removal of the mixed motive theory meant “because of” means “but for.”  For 
the plaintiff to recover he or she must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence the protected status, age, was the “but for” cause, or sole reason, for 
the adverse employment action.129  Only having a “but for” standard 
significantly reduces a plaintiff’s chance for a successful ADEA claim.130 
With one sweep of the pen, the Supreme Court changed the relationship 
between Title VII and the ADEA analysis.  The over forty-year history of 
substantially interpreting the Acts similarly is now questionable. 
III.  THE ADEA & MIXED MOTIVE: HOW AND WHY 
The Supreme Court made the wrong decision.  Eliminating the mixed 
motive theory from the ADEA leaves a large segment of the population with 
weak protection against discrimination.131  The Court, as it suggested, did not 
need to remove this theory.132  The mixed motive theory is not inconsistent 
with the ADEA.  The theory can be incorporated in the ADEA because it is 
 
 123. Id. at 2349. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 2351–52. 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) (2006); see generally Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351–52. 
 128. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. JERRY W. HEDGE ET AL., THE AGING WORKFORCE: REALITIES, MYTHS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS 45 (2006). 
 132. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350. 
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inherent to the statute; Congress intended the CRA of 1991 to apply to the 
statute; or the Price Waterhouse mixed motive theory controls the statute.  
Further, public policy strongly supports this theory.  Discrimination is 
economically and mentally harmful.133  In addition, incorporating the mixed 
motive theory in the ADEA includes a theory more compatible with human 
decision-making.134  A theory such as this will likely find an employer is liable 
for its discriminatory actions more often.  As a result, the ADEA will have a 
larger deterrent effect.  Employers will be encouraged to be aware of possible 
discriminatory actions and employ people based on individual ability and not 
stereotypes. 
A. The ADEA and Mixed Motives: How to Find Mixed Motives 
Mixed motive causation exists in the ADEA.  The following section 
analyzes how the mixed motive theory exists from three distinct analytical 
standpoints, beginning with the most desirable interpretation: 1) the mixed 
motives theory is inherent because of the statute’s language and purpose; 2) the 
CRA of 1991 and its mixed motive amendment applies to the ADEA; and 3) 
the mixed motive test articulated in Price Waterhouse controls. 
1. Best Analysis: Mixed Motive Theory is Inherent in the ADEA’s Text 
and Purpose 
Neither the CRA of 1991 nor prior case law are needed to find the mixed 
motive theory exists in the ADEA framework.  The current language and 
purpose of the ADEA on its own supports a finding of the theory. 
The ADEA and Title VII have similar origins and were prompted by 
similar concerns: to prevent discrimination against employees because 
discrimination denies them full participation in the workforce.135  Taking these 
factors into account and the ADEA’s text, a mixed motive theory can be found 
under the ADEA just as the Price Waterhouse Court found the mixed motives 
theory under Title VII.  The Gross and Price Waterhouse Courts interpreted 
identical language in their respective statutes, save the enumeration of the 
protected status.136  If the interpretation can be found by analyzing one statute, 
it can be found when interpreting identical language in another statute. 
The ADEA was enacted to prevent discrimination in employment.137  As 
Professor Blumrosen suggests, when interpreting a statute of this nature, the 
Court needs to understand the big picture and consider what Congress tried to 
 
 133. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 134. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). 
 136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (plurality opinion); Gross, 129 
S. Ct. at 2351–52. 
 137. 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
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achieve with the statutory text.138  In other words, let the reason for enacting 
the statute give context to the text.  The ADEA states: “It shall be unlawful for 
an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”139  
The key language is “because of.”  Here, Congress established the ADEA to 
encourage employment decisions based on the individual’s abilities.140  
Discrimination is economically and mentally harmful whenever it exists, 
whether or not it co-exists with legal factors.141 
Consequently, a finding of “but for” causation in the statute is inconsistent 
with its purpose.  The definition of solely “but for” does not necessarily or 
naturally follow from the ADEA’s text, as Justice Thomas suggested.142  After 
 
 138. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination and 
Legislative Intent:  The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99, 104–07, 117–
20 (1983).  Professor Blumrosen in reviewing Title VII found Title VII employed a novel concept 
of seeking to address needs of a select group in society.  Id. at 104.  Due to the novelty of the 
concept, Congress had a difficult time articulating the goals of the legislation with the current 
lexicon.  Id.  Therefore, by gaining an understanding of the Act’s overall purpose, legislative 
history, and limitation of the words used and their current and prior definitions, the statute can be 
properly interpreted.  Id. at 104–07, 117–20. 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). 
 140. Id. at § 62; W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S 400, 422 (1985). 
 141. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (2006). 
 142. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).  For example, post-structuralism 
of the postmodern school of thought believes there is no one single definition to any word and 
that a word’s definition varies on its context.  Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern 
Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2521 (1992). 
In the structuralist view, language and its structures predate the individual and themselves 
create meaning, rather than meaning being created by individual consciousness or simply 
being out there in nature for people to identify. Meaning is not an objective, fixed “thing” 
that language reflects, but is something produced by language. Language, moreover, is a 
collective or shared system of signification, consisting of culturally and historically 
constituted codes transmitted to people through linguistic structures. 
Id.  Legal scholars routinely use elements of postmodernism to interpret the law and statutes; 
examples include legal realism, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, 
pragmatism, and civic republicanism.  Id. at 2575–76.  Judge Learned Hand espoused similar 
beliefs: 
All [legislators] have done is to write down certain words which they mean to apply 
generally to situations of that kind. To apply these literally may either pervert what was 
plainly their general meaning, or leave indisposed of what there is every reason to 
suppose they meant to provide for. Thus, it is not enough for the judge just to use a 
dictionary. If he should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible 
man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was intended; which would 
contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose. 
Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1095, 
1114–15 (1993) (quoting Learned Hand, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952)). 
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all, the Price Waterhouse Court found an entirely different yet plausible 
definition of “because of.”143  In his Gross dissent, Stevens adeptly noted that 
Webster’s Dictionary does not modify its “because of” definition, which is “by 
reason of” or “on account of,” with the words solely or exclusively.144  The text 
“because of” only requires a causal link between the ageism and the adverse 
employment action.  The ADEA’s purpose is to ensure the decision maker did 
not act with any age stereotypes. 
The ADEA, just like Title VII, wants to eliminate discrimination, so the 
causation standard needs to provide incentives for decision makers to not 
harbor such animus, or at the very least try to not allow the animus to influence 
the decision.145  A high causation threshold standard creates little incentive to 
rid oneself of animus because there is a diminished chance of liability.  
Therefore, a motivating factor causation standard encourages decision makers 
to rid themselves of discriminatory intent because no amount of this intent is 
allowed to factor into the employment decision.  A finding of liability when 
ageism is a motivating factor is consistent with the legislative intent.146  As a 
result, “because of” means a motivating factor. 
The ADEA’s structure further supports the motivating factor causation 
standard.  The statute indicates lawful employment decisions can be based on 
age when the decision is based on a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the 
business.147  The BFOQ section clearly indicates Congress contemplated 
situations when age can be a factor in the employment decision.148  Since 
Congress indicated one instance and no other instances when employment 
decisions can consider age, a motivating factor causation standard is 
appropriate. 
In keeping with the theme of a lower threshold, a mixed motive causation 
standard will be satisfied with the presentation of direct or circumstantial 
evidence.  In Desert Palace, the Court held absent an explicit heightened 
evidentiary standard, the presumed standard is the preponderance of the 
evidence, shown with direct or circumstantial evidence.149  Similar to Title 
VII’s text, the ADEA is devoid of a heightened evidentiary standard.150  
Without an explicit instruction, the law will favor neither circumstantial nor 
 
 143. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 144. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
 147. Id. at § 623(f). 
 148. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242. 
 149. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 68, 99–100 (2003). 
 150. Rachid v. Jack in the Box Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) 
(2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
246 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:229 
direct evidence.151  The subtle distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence causes categorization to be inconsistent.152  Inconsistencies in 
categorization are problematic if one category allows a case to proceed and the 
other ends the matter.  Further, the use of circumstantial evidence can be more 
influential than direct evidence to prove a fact.153  Finally, in other ADEA 
contexts, the Court has rejected impositions of other special evidentiary 
standards.154  As a result, burdens under the ADEA can be met with 
circumstantial evidence.155 
The ADEA can be reasonably and should be interpreted to have a mixed 
motive causation standard, satisfied with either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. 
2. Better Analysis: Congress Intended Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Apply 
to ADEA Claims 
The mixed motive theory is available to the ADEA because of the CRA of 
1991.  Interpreting the ADEA and the general scheme of anti-discrimination 
statutes requires an understanding of Congress’s intent: what are the Act’s 
purposes and its intended extent.156 
However, Justice Thomas, the author of the Gross majority opinion, 
candidly embraces textualism.157  In Harbison v. Bell, Thomas, in his 
concurrence, flatly states it is not the Court’s task to interpret statutes “in a way 
that it believes consistent with the policy outcome intended by Congress. . . . 
Rather, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most 
 
 151. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99–100. 
 152. Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2000); Jennifer R. 
Gowens, Plaintiffs’ Direct Evidence Burden in Mixed-Motive Disparate Treatment Cases, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 149, 170–78 (2003). 
 153. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957). 
 154. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006). 
 156. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating 
Title VII should be interpreted in the context of its social purpose); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole 
statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or 
authorities that inform the analysis.”); United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) 
(“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, 
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”). 
 157. Textualism can be understood as a rule-based approach to statutory interpretation.  Caleb 
Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 398 (2005).  Textualists gravitate to 
interpretations that are based on the text of the statute, if the language is otherwise unambiguous.  
John F. Manning, Textalism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 439–40 (2005). 
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faithful to its text.”158  Thomas adheres to this philosophy even if his or “the 
proper” interpretation of the statute results in “very bad policy.”159 
Blind adherence to statutory text is an ill-guided way to interpret statutes.  
It leads to interpretations which harm society, fail to reach Congressional 
legislative goals, and misunderstand the legislative process and human 
nature.160  A belief that statutory text tells it all involves false assumptions that 
Congress members fully understood the goals they were trying to reach, that 
Congress used the perfect language to convey these goals, and that the text’s 
words have a crystallized, universal definition.161  To make this interpretation 
tool more palatable some courts justify their exclusive focus on the text 
through the Congressional acquiescence theory.  This theory is based on the 
notion Congress is aware of all the Court’s statutory interpretations.162  So, 
Congress must approve of the interpretation if it does not amend a statute to 
override an interpretation.163 
The Congressional acquiescence theory fails to consider several factors.  
Legislation to overrule a statute is expensive and time consuming.164  Merely 
because Congress amends a similar statute, it does not necessarily follow 
Congress was able to, and chose not to, amend the other statute.165  Even if the 
statutes are similar, it is not necessarily easy to garner support or financially 
feasible to amend both statutes. 166  So, the failure to amend does not 
automatically signify Congress means for the case law to develop divergent 
paths.167 
A second issue with the Congressional acquiescence theory is 
interpretational ambiguity.  A Congress member may choose to refrain from 
action for reasons other than approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.  
 
 158. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1493–94 (2009). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedent and the Separation of Powers:  
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009). 
 161. Blumrosen, supra note 138, at 111. 
 162. Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
217, 236–37 (2007). 
 163. Id. at 237; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488–89 (1940) (“The long time 
failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by 
Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is 
persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one.  This is the 
more so where, as here, the application of the statute to labor unions has brought forth sharply 
conflicting views both on the Court and in Congress, and where after the matter has been fully 
brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, the latter has not seen fit to change the 
statute.”). 
 164. Prenkert, supra note 162, at 250. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
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For example, the CRA of 1991’s legislative history included a rule of 
construction for how the anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted.168  
This amendment was rejected not necessarily for its content but for fear of its 
affect.  Then President George H.W. Bush believed the provision would spur 
needless litigation over how to construe the statute.169  Courts should not place 
significance on the failure to act but instead consider whether the proposed 
interpretation defeats the law’s purpose.170 
Consequently, Congressional overrides need to be guideposts for future 
court interpretation.171  In the background, a court should consider that 
Congress cannot technically overrule case law, but only make the statutory text 
inconsistent with the interpretation Congress seeks to overrule.172  According 
to Professor Farber, “enacting legislators would prefer courts give strong 
weight to stare decisis in statutory cases, even at the expense of fidelity to the 
original legislative deal.”173  In this situation, the interpretative relationship 
between Title VII and the ADEA should be preserved. 
The Gross majority reasoned the lack of amendment to the ADEA was 
significant.174  However, nineteen years had passed since the CRA of 1991, 
and throughout this time, courts applied the mixed motive theory to the 
ADEA.175  Even FBL Financial’s counsel did not consider the possibility of 
removing the mixed motive theory until after the petition for certiorari.176  The 
parties and courts assumed the ADEA included a mixed motive theory.  Parties 
fought over the required evidentiary standard necessary to receive the mixed 
 
 168.  
SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS.  . . . “(c) 
INTERPRETATION.—In interpreting Federal civil rights laws, including laws protecting 
against discrimination on the basis of . . . age, . . . courts and administrative agencies shall 
not rely on the amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 as a basis for limiting 
the theories of liability, rights, and remedies available under civil rights laws not 
expressly amended by such Act. 
Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991:  Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1161–62 (1993) 
(quoting S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 11 (1990), set forth in H.R. REP. NO. 101-755, at 7 (1990) (Conf. 
Rep.)). 
 169. Presidential Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 
1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1634 (Oct. 22, 1990). 
 170. See Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1140. 
 171. See Prenkert, supra note 162, at 263; Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1099. 
 172. Widiss, supra note 160, at 514. 
 173. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2, 12–13 (1988). 
 174. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). 
 175. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2004); Salter v. Alltel 
Commc’ns, 407 F. Supp. 2d 730, 734 (E.D.N.C. 2005); Machinchick v. PB Power, 398 F.3d 345, 
355 (5th Cir. 2005); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 176. Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2348. 
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motive instruction.177  The same logic the Gross majority uses to reach its 
conclusion can be used to reach the opposite: Congress approved the use of a 
mixed motive analysis.  If Congress disapproved of a mixed motive theory in 
the ADEA, it would have amended the statute clearly to exclude the theory. 
Courts need to keep a bird’s eye view of the state of the law in order to 
keep statutory interpretation consistent with Congressional intent.  Congress in 
the CRA of 1991 rejected the Court’s use of the “plain meaning” statutory 
interpretation technique.178  Since Congress rejected a number of “plain 
meaning” cases, this interpretation style likely does not properly interpret the 
statute.179  Thus, the Gross Court should have looked to Congressional intent 
and determined Congress intended the CRA of 1991 to cover the ADEA. 
Congress’ failure to exclude the mixed motives theory in ADEA, after over 
19 years of including the mixed motive theory, can be seen as Congress’ 
approval of the theory.  If Congress wanted to change the interpretation 
scheme of discrimination law, it would have expressly indicated its 
disapproval.  Absent express disapproval, Congress prefers the Court interpret 
the statutes in accordance with its previous history.180 
3. The Fallback Analysis: Mixed Motive and Price Waterhouse 
At the very least, the ADEA has the mixed motive theory as set forth by 
Price Waterhouse.  The retention of this mixed motive theory is not ideal 
because Congress did partially overrule Price Waterhouse in the CRA of 
1991.181  However, this analysis at least keeps the mixed motive theory within 
the ADEA and a semblance of stability within the ADEA and discrimination 
laws’ framework.  Courts should strive to keep stability in statutory 
interpretation and should always consider the ramifications of upsetting 
precedents.182  When the interpretations of the law remain consistent, the law 
becomes predictable.  Consistency helps parties avoid the possibility of 
liability, and it helps parties know when their rights have been violated and 
when to seek redress for their injuries.183 
Of course, judicial interpretation of the law as applied to divergent fact 
patterns will create inconsistencies.  However, this inconsistency happens on 
the micro level and can be expected with fact intensive inquiries, such as in 
employment discrimination law.  The fundamental essence of the law remains 
the same.  However, Gross creates inconsistency on the macro level because it 
 
 177. See id. 
 178. See Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1101. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Farber, supra note 173, at 12–13. 
 181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 182. Widiss, supra note 160, at 560. 
 183. Id. 
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has removed the mixed motive theory altogether from the ADEA.184  The 
Court should strive to avoid widespread inconsistencies and retain, at the 
minimum, Price Waterhouse’s mixed motive theory under the ADEA. 
In 2005, the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson was faced with a 
substantively similar question: whether there is a disparate impact cause of 
action under the ADEA, and if so, what governs the analysis.185  The Supreme 
Court held the disparate impact theory, which developed in Title VII case law, 
was available under the ADEA.186  Further, it held Wards Cove, a Title VII 
case that predated the CRA of 1991, controls the ADEA disparate impact 
analysis.187 
To reach its holding, the Court examined the almost identical text between 
the two acts.188  Because these texts are similar in word choice and enacted 
close in time, the Court interpreted the texts similarly.189  The two statutes’ 
structures are also analogous.  The ADEA’s affirmative defense of RFOA is 
analogous to Title VII’s affirmative defense of business necessity.190  
However, the ADEA’s affirmative defense is interpreted more broadly and, 
thus, provides more protection to employers.191  As a result, the Court 
 
 184. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2357 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Were the Court truly worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, moreover, it 
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raises both ADEA and Title VII claims.”); Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order 
Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives 
Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 554–56 (2008) (noting courts routinely apply the mixed motive 
theory to Americans with Disability Act claims, to Title VII retaliation claims, and to Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act claims in spite of the absence of explicit statutory text authorizing the mixed 
motive theory); Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(finding since the Jury Systems Improvement Act’s language “by reason of” is similar to the 
ADEA’s “because of,” “by reason of” also means “but for,” as articulated by Gross); Bolmer v. 
Oliveria, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (questioning whether the mixed motive theory exists 
under Title II after Gross). 
 185. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 240 (2005); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 186. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 232–33.  In Smith, the Court analyzed this text of the ADEA:  “to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s age.”  Id. at 233 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006)).  The Wards Cove Court 
had analyzed almost identical text found in Title VII:  “to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in ways that would adversely affect any employee because of the employee’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645 
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071; 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 14, at § 703(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
(2006)). 
 189. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. 
 190. Id. at 240–41. 
 191. Id. at 240. 
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authorized a very narrow use of disparate impact, which heavily favors 
employers. 
If the reasoning in Smith v. City of Jackson is followed with Gross, the 
unmodified Price Waterhouse holding should control the mixed motive theory 
under the ADEA.  Price Waterhouse is to Gross as Wards Cove is to Smith.  
As determined in Smith, the ADEA and Title VII have similar purposes, which 
are achieved with substantially the same language.192  Both Acts encourage 
basing employment decisions on an individual’s ability and not on 
stereotypes.193  In Price Waterhouse, the interpreted text is identical to the text 
interpreted in Wards Cove, which is still the same language interpreted in 
Gross and in Smith.194  The ADEA and Title VII both contain the language 
“because of.”  Neither Act requires the protected employment characteristic to 
be the “but for,” or sole cause, for the employment decision.195  Therefore, just 
like Price Waterhouse, a decision can be made because of a protected status, so 
long as legal factors also motivate the decision.196 
In addition, the statutes still have similar structures.  Both contain the 
BFOQ defense, in which Congress explicitly contemplated when protected 
statuses could be considered.197  Since Congress only specifically enumerated 
one instance, in all other instances a protected status cannot be a motivating 
factor in the decision.198  However, an employer can avoid liability by showing 
with a preponderance of the evidence the same decision would have been made 
absent the protected status.199 
The dissent was correct to have said Justice White’s opinion in Price 
Waterhouse controls.200  Under the Marks doctrine, in a plurality opinion, the 
narrowest opinion controls.201  In Price Waterhouse, the plurality held the 
protected status only needs to be a motivating factor.202  It is silent regarding 
whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence to receive a mixed motive 
analysis.203  It further held an employer could prove the same decision defense 
 
 192. Id. at 233. 
 193. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 194. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
 195. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 196. Id. at 258. 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006). 
 198. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion). 
 199. Id. at 258. 
 200. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356–57 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 201. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 202. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion). 
 203. Id. at 256–58. 
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only through objective evidence.204  Importantly, the plurality held a plaintiff 
only needs to show the protected status motivated the decision.205 
White concurred the protected status need only be a motivating factor. 206  
He, like the plurality, is silent on a heightened evidentiary standard that 
requires the plaintiff to produce direct evidence to receive the mixed motive 
analysis.207  White wrote separate from the plurality because of their 
articulation of the same decision defense; he finds instead that employers can 
succeed on the credibility of their testimony alone and need not present 
objective evidence.208  White concludes an employer can be liable when the 
protected status is a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.209 
O’Connor concurred that the protected status must be a substantial 
factor.210  She, unlike the plurality and White, held a plaintiff can only receive 
the mixed motive analysis upon a showing of direct evidence of 
discrimination.211  A heightened evidentiary rule, like requiring direct 
evidence, departs from the conventional litigation rule.212  A ruling requiring a 
heightened standard should be explicitly agreed to and is broader than not 
mentioning a heightened standard.  White concurred on a narrower ground 
than O’Connor did, so his opinion is controlling.  As a result, a plaintiff can 
satisfy his or her burden and receive the mixed motive analysis with direct or 
circumstantial evidence. 
In following the logic of Smith and the desire to create some stability in the 
law, at a minimum the ADEA should have the mixed motive theory articulated 
in Price Waterhouse. 
B. The ADEA and Mixed Motives: Why Society Needs the Mixed Motive 
Theory 
Public policy strongly supports finding a reasonable interpretation of the 
ADEA that does not thwart its purpose to “promote employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather than age.”213  Removing the mixed motive 
theory severely limits the opportunity a plaintiff has to succeed on a claim.  
The surviving standard of causation, “but for,” as Justice O’Connor noted, is 
 
 204. Id. at 252, 261. 
 205. Id. at 258. 
 206. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 
 207. Id. at 238–58 (plurality opinion); id. at 258–59, 261 (White, J., concurring). 
 208. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260–61 (plurality opinion). 
 209. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 
 210. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003). 
 213. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006). 
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tantamount to making the discrimination laws inapplicable to employment 
decisions.214 
A “but for” standard narrowly construes the ADEA and allows an 
employer to commit harmful discriminatory acts without fear of liability.  A 
broader causation standard such as mixed motive is needed to deter 
discriminatory employment practices based on ageism.  First, the “but for” 
standard misunderstands how humans make decisions.215  Many discriminatory 
motivations will be unchecked because humans rarely make decisions “but 
for” one factor.216  Second, ageism will cause unemployment or 
underemployment, which will cause mental and economic hardship.217  Society 
benefits with a less tolerant attitude to ageism because value is placed on 
employing individuals based on ability and not on discriminatory 
stereotypes.218  Failing to deter ageism on a wide scale basis is mentally and 
economically harmful.219  Consequently, the ADEA needs a mixed motive 
theory. 
1. The Mixed Motive Theory is a Better Fit to the Human Decision-
Making Process 
Human decision-making is a process.220  Simply defined, decision-making 
is a choice made amongst two or more alternatives.221  But, more accurately, 
decision-making is a multi-step process.  The first step is problem recognition 
and value assessment.222  During this stage, the decision maker must determine 
his or her values and goals in order to orientate the decision maker to the 
problem and help to define the problem itself.223  A problem is defined in 
 
 214. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 215. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See JOHN D. MULLEN & BYRON M. ROTH, DECISION-MAKING: ITS LOGIC AND PROCESS 
5–6 (1991).  Human decision-making process is simplified because there are too many stimuli in 
our environment to account for everything.  See id. at 21–23.  Humans have overcome these 
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 222. MULLEN & ROTH, supra note 220, at 2. 
 223. Id.  Values may simply consider the decision maker’s own good or may consider the 
social good.  Id.  The value set the decision maker operates from affects the decision:  Should I 
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at 2, 81–82. 
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consideration of the relevant acts and possible outcomes.224  The second and 
third steps involve the creation and evaluation of alternatives.225  During these 
stages, a decision maker considers each alternative’s benefit, regret, and cost to 
determine how well each alternative will fulfill the goal.226  The fourth step is 
the choice.227  After the choice is made, a decision maker will test the choice 
against a wide range of possible circumstances to confirm the choice.228 
In contrast, legal decisions strive to create finality and certainty in order to 
simplify and condense the decision-making process.229  Legal reasoning 
focuses on selecting a few facts, defining them, and then classifying them into 
categories.230  Categorization simplifies the issue and “lends an aura of logical 
inevitability to the legal conclusion that follows the categorization.”231  Legal 
reasoning also strives to simplify the process because legal decisions need to 
capture the public’s trust in order to achieve justice.232 
An example of the legal reasoning is “but for” causation.  With this 
standard, courts rely on the myth that a decision can have one reason and have 
defined “but for” causation to mean that, for example, age was the reason for 
the decision and had a determinative influence on the outcome.233  Thus, legal 
decisions appear more final and certain when the decision maker focuses the 
scope of the decision by reducing the chaos of multiple facts and issues.234 
Legal decision makers distrust uncertain factors, such as mixed motives, 
because they introduce ambiguity.235  In order to avoid ambiguity, legal 
decision makers discount that beliefs are influenced by cultural, biological, and 
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 233. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). 
 234. Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 229, at 6–9. 
 235. Jonathan Uffelman, Hamlet was a Law Student:  A “Dramatic” Look at Emotion’s Effect 
on Analogical Reasoning, 96 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1773 (2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] TIPPING THE BALANCE BACK 255 
situational forces because the actual influence these factors have on an 
individual is unknown.236  Not surprisingly, these decision makers are also 
skeptical of applying overarching theories of human decision-making and bias 
to a single individual.237  This distrust may be because social science research 
results are largely inconclusive and ambiguous when compared to legal 
decisions.  Yet, the use of probabilistic social science research data can also 
help achieve justice.238  The ADEA targets intangible motivations of human 
behavior.  Quantifying and qualifying human nature and motivations is not 
precise.239  However, social science research can be especially helpful in 
understanding the human decision-making process and the influences on a 
particular decision.240 
Legal decision-making is disjointed from typical decision-making because 
few problems in life present themselves in such an orderly fashion.  Decision-
making must be done under crisis, risk, certainty, stress, knowledge, ignorance, 
long-term deadlines, short-term deadlines, or convergence of any of these 
factors. 241  To add to the complexity, though decision makers make decisions 
in the moment, the decision is not isolated in time.242  Instead, the decision is 
the product of years of stimuli.243  Because of their complexity, it is too 
difficult to isolate any one decision in time or in logical connectivity.244  One 
researcher analogized the decision-making process to the manufacturing of 
goods.245  Each mini or sub-decision is the building block of the next until the 
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final decision is reached.  Thus, decisions and their outcomes should not be, 
and likely cannot be, considered simple creatures. 246 
Due to the complexity of the process, a decision maker has several barriers 
to making unbiased decisions.  During the process, he or she is likely to jump 
to a conclusion, prematurely evaluate the criteria, over rely on experience, 
prematurely commit to possible conclusions, confuse the decision’s problems 
and symptoms, or not diversify the alternatives.247  Cognitive dissonance is a 
common way a decision maker distorts the process.  Decision makers are 
uncomfortable when their beliefs are not supported by newly acquired 
knowledge, so decision makers will avoid cognitive dissonance whenever 
possible. 248 
The decision maker also distorts the process with confirmation bias, which 
is focusing on ways to affirm a conclusion.249  The decision maker disregards 
or effectively explains away unsupportive information.250  Decision makers 
will sacrifice the quality of the information or simply limit the quantity of 
research in order to avoid finding their conclusion is wrong.251 
In addition, primacy also distorts the decision-making process.  A decision 
maker is likely to place a disproportionate influence on information discovered 
early in a process, making how a problem begins indicative of how the 
decision maker will resolve it.252  The primacy of the initial information 
distorts how the decision maker comprehends new information, especially 
inconsistent information.253  For example, in hiring decisions, the initial 
screening interview impressions heavily influence the post-interview hiring 
decision.254 
Finally, issue presentation and personal experience distort the decision-
making process because they affect how the decision maker solves the 
problem.  How the problem is framed or presented will affect how the decision 
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maker understands and seeks to solve it.255  Generally, a decision maker will 
not try to look at a problem in a new light or even recognize it can be 
conceptualized differently.256  Similarly, habits, experience, knowledge, 
preconceived beliefs, and preferences all affect the context in which the 
decision maker understands the issues.257  Even how a decision maker 
evaluates the alternatives can be affected by the order in which he or she 
learned of them.258  Therefore, an alternative decision will not necessarily be 
chosen for its strengths. 
Not surprisingly, decision makers have a hard time recalling the reasons 
for their decisions.  Our beliefs are important to us, but, even with firmly held 
beliefs, we quickly forget the belief’s origin.259  So, what a decision maker 
does recall is distorted.  For example, prejudice unconsciously distorts decision 
recall.  In a study, while participants displayed no overt bias in hiring minority 
candidates, a week later the participants could not accurately recall the 
candidates.260  Though the candidates had identical responses, participants 
recalled the minority candidates answered the questions less intelligently than 
majority candidates did.261  Decision makers may not be able to identify that 
they cannot accurately recall reasons for their decision. 
Recall is also distorted by the decision maker’s actual actions as well as his 
or her knowledge of what happened.262  If the decision maker believes the 
decision is favorable, hindsight bias is greater, and the decision maker’s 
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memory of the decision is more supportive of it.263  For example, if a decision 
maker receives positive feedback from discharging an employee, he or she is 
likely to remember, in hindsight, the supportive factors and fewer of the 
unsupportive factors.  In short, decision makers overestimate the accuracy of 
their judgment.264  Decision recall will not accurately reflect the considerations 
that made the decision. 
The “but for” causation standard is incompatible with human decision-
making.  The decision-making process is a complex process, with a multitude 
of criteria and influences.  The law is disingenuous when it requires complex 
decisions be boiled down to one defining factor.  Also, because decision 
makers act in complex environments, it is unlikely a decision had a “but for” 
cause and the “but for” cause can be identified.265  When the law asks an 
employer why it acted, the employer cannot accurately recall the decision’s 
factors.  Instead, motives are ascribed after the fact when it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the influence each factor had on the decision.266  If an 
employer cannot accurately recall his motivation and what he or she does 
remember is distorted, the law should not require a sole reason.  A mixed 
motive accounts for the shortcomings of knowing what motivated a decision 
and/or distortion in decision recall.  Thus, a mixed motive theory is necessary 
for the ADEA to fulfill its purpose.267 
2. Ageism is Harmful 
As a society, we should be concerned about ageism and its discriminatory 
effects because a substantial portion of the population is covered by the 
ADEA.  The Baby Boomer generation alone is over seventy million strong, all 
over age forty, and all covered by the ADEA.268  This generation accounted for 
roughly half of the workforce in 2006.269  Americans over 65, those more 
vulnerable to discrimination, belong to the fastest growing segment of the 
working population in the 1990s at 20%.270  “Starting on Jan. 1, [2011,] our 
79-million-strong baby boom generation will be turning 65 at the rate of one 
every eight seconds.  That means more than 10,000 people per day, or more 
than four million per year, for the next 19 years . . . .”271  In June 2008, more 
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than 2 million workers age 55 and over were unemployed and seeking work.272  
These unemployed workers likely faced difficulties in finding new 
employment.273 
If age discrimination is left unchecked,274 more older workers will be 
forced out of the workforce entirely or into lower skilled jobs.  Forced 
retirement or underemployment is harmful because many people derive 
satisfaction and identity from their jobs.275  Social roles such as worker, parent, 
or spouse form the basis of self-identity, so performance and assessment in one 
of these roles correlates to how a person perceives his or her self-worth.276  A 
worker may have negative self-worth if he or she is un- or underemployed.  
Job loss adversely affects personal relationships, physical health, and mental 
health.277  Forced un- or underemployment has negative repercussions on self-
identity and mental health. 
Older workers also need to remain in the work place to remain fiscally 
healthy.  Growth of employer-based pension plans has stagnated with only 
roughly half of all private-sector workers covered by pension plans.278  
Retirees must rely on savings, investments, and government assistance to 
replace pension plan funds.279  Health care costs are also rising.  Retirees are 
now responsible for bearing a larger burden of higher health care costs, which 
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result from increasing costs, decreasing treatment coverage, and plan eligibility 
restrictions.280  A retiree must handle these increased financial responsibilities 
even after the economy has taken a toll on their personal savings.  From 
September 2007 to 2008, retirement accounts lost roughly eighteen percent of 
their value.281  As a result of market conditions’ effect on retirement savings in 
2000, twenty percent of potential retirees pushed back retirement in order to 
build up their retirement savings.282  So, given the current state of economic 
welfare, the longer an individual is employed, the less likely he or she will 
outlive his or her savings.283  Older workers need the law to protect them and 
keep them employable in order to cope with all of their financial 
responsibilities.  Accordingly, the ADEA must take steps, such as including 
the mixed motive theory, to better protect older workers. 
Finally, as a society, it is to our advantage to keep older workers employed 
because it keeps our economy healthy.  If older workers remain employed, 
they can remain self-sufficient instead of relying on public welfare 
programs.284  Large numbers of citizens using public welfare programs puts a 
huge fiscal strain on public financing.285  In addition, older people are 
productive, talented workers.286  Removing them from the workforce reduces 
the talent pool.  By removing older workers from the workforce, the economy 
is squeezed in two ways: by increasing public funding to welfare programs and 
by losing out on a talented labor force. 
CONCLUSION 
Age discrimination is harmful.  Older workers who are discriminated 
against suffer mental and financial hardships.287  The effects can be 
devastating.  Thus, the law needs to afford proper protection. 
In order to do this, the ADEA needs the mixed motive theory.  Recall from 
the introduction, Gregory, who produced evidence his employer thought he 
was too old to work, could not prove a viable claim under “but for” causation.  
It is precisely because of situations such as Gregory’s the mixed motives 
theory should be reintroduced.  The law can reasonably interpret a mixed 
motive theory from 1) the text and purpose of the ADEA, 2) Congressional 
 
 280. Id. at 11. 
 281. RICHARD W. JOHNSON ET AL., HOW IS THE ECONOMIC TURMOIL AFFECTING OLDER 
AMERICANS? 2 (2008). 
 282. Rix, supra note 274, at 601. 
 283. HEDGE ET AL., supra note 131, at 165–66. 
 284. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104; Matt 
Sedensky, Forced to Retire, Some Take Social Security Early, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2010, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11352830. 
 285. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104. 
 286. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16. 
 287. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] TIPPING THE BALANCE BACK 261 
intent and the CRA of 1991, or 3) the Price Waterhouse’s articulation of mixed 
motives.  Because a mixed motive theory better conforms to the decision-
making process, it can more effectively deter discrimination. 
The “but for” theory is inadequate because decision makers distort factors 
while forming the decision and when attempting to recall what happened.288  
This distortion reduces the chance motive will be adequately ascribed.289  The 
mixed motive theory, however, recognizes these shortcomings and attaches 
liability when it is known an illegal factor had a motivating influence on the 
decision.290 
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